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FROM THE MAGAZINE

Free from Decree
The Supremes decide for democracy.

David Schoenbrod, Ross Sandler

M ayors and governors come and go, but judicial decrees against state and local governments live forever. Change,
however, is on the way. This June, the Supreme Court’s decision in Horne v. Flores opened a door through which newly
elected officials may more quickly be released from onerous, expensive, and counterproductive judicial supervision.
Judicial decrees are born after someone, often an advocacy group, launches a lawsuit against a state or city, charging
that it failed to live up to the requirements of a law, often one related to the execution of social, education, or welfare
programs. If the government officials being sued want to have some say in the duties to be imposed on them, they will
often negotiate with the plaintiff’s attorneys on the terms of the decree to be signed by the judge. Court orders
resulting from this type of litigation come in many forms—consent orders, preliminary injunctions, declaratory
judgments—but all give officials specific instructions on how to manage the programs in question. These decrees then
become mandatory obligations on the officials’ successors, meaning that incoming mayors and governors must
struggle with the plans, bargains, and tradeoffs that their predecessors agreed to—often decades earlier. In New York
City, for example, three judicial decrees (governing special education, public housing, and Rikers Island) are more
than 30 years old, and two others (governing the city’s treatment of the homeless) are more than 20 years old.
Relief may finally be in the offing. Horne’s roots go back to 2000, when a federal court—ruling that Arizona had
violated a federal statute requiring states to take “appropriate action” to eliminate language hurdles for nonEnglish
speaking children—ordered the state to appropriate more money for bilingual education. In 2006, the state’s
superintendent of education asked for the court order to be modified, maintaining that Arizona was actually in
compliance with the statute: while not all the money called for by the decree had been appropriated, the
superintendent argued, the state had met the federal law through other means, particularly a shift to Englishlanguage
immersion, increases in education funding generally, and adherence to the No Child Left Behind statute. The lower
courts found the superintendent’s claim insufficient and ordered the state to go ahead and appropriate the extra
money. But in Horne, the Supreme Court has reversed their ruling, deciding 5–4 that they adopted the wrong standard
in reviewing the superintendent’s motion. The Supreme Court sent the case back to district court, telling the judge to
release officials from the requirement to appropriate the money, provided that they had complied with the original
federal statute.
In the past, when newly elected officials sought to be released from court supervision, they met with stiff resistance
from plaintiffs’ attorneys and judges who, over the years, had become wedded to the old encrusted decrees and the
power they afforded over municipal policy. The new standard sidesteps these obligations and returns to the language
of the underlying federal statute. It would, the Court held, be inequitable to bind state and local officials to old decrees
in instances where the federal law has already been vindicated. The Court said, in so many words, that an old decree is
not a rigid contract but a means to an end, and that if the end has been achieved, judges should stand aside. The new
formulation will be tested when lowercourt judges actually begin to rule on motions by officials asking to be freed
from obligations found in old decrees.
The Horne decision vindicates a longrunning effort of the Manhattan Institute and City Journal. Fifteen years ago,
encouraged by Edward Costikyan, a friend of City Journal, and Myron Magnet, then its editor, we first wrote about
how old court orders hobbled newly elected New York City officials in adopting or refining policies (see “Government
by Decree,” Summer 1994). The article provoked discussion and debate, and the Manhattan Institute eventually helped
support the writing of our 2003 booklength treatment, Democracy by Decree. Justice Samuel Alito, for the majority, and
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, for the dissenters, both cited Democracy by Decree in their opinions.

Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod are professors at New York Law School and the coauthors of Democracy by
Decree: What Happens When Courts Run Government.
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